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ABSTRACT  
   
This paper investigates the role of top management and board interlocks 
between acquirers and targets. I hypothesize that an interlock may exacerbate 
agency problems due to conflicting interests and lead to value-decreasing 
acquisition. An interlock may also serve as a conduit of information and personal 
experience, and reduce the cost of information gathering for both firms. I find 
supporting evidence for these two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses. Consistent 
with the agency hypothesis, interlocked acquirers underperform non-interlocked 
acquirers by 2% during the announcement period. However, well-governed 
acquirers receive higher announcement returns and have better post-acquisition 
performance in interlocked deals. The proportional surplus accrued to an acquirer 
is positively correlated with the interlocking agent's ownership in the acquirer 
relative to her ownership in the target. Consistent with the information hypothesis, 
when the target’s firm value is opaque, interlocks improve acquirer announcement 
returns and long-term performance. Interlocked acquirers are also more likely to 
use equity as payment, especially when the acquirer's stock value is opaque. 
Target announcement returns are not influenced by the existence of interlock. 
Finally, I find acquisitions are more likely to occur between two interlocked firms 
and such deals have a higher completion rate. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The finance literature has shown that US public firms are pervasively interlocked 
through their board of directors, and that interlocks have significant economic 
consequences. The vast network of connected officers and directors can contribute to 
agency conflicts if the network increases manager entrenchment or leads to conflicts of 
interest between connected firms. The network may also, however, alleviate information 
asymmetry by serving as an intermediary that helps management obtain information at a 
lower cost. I study the effect of interlocks in the context of mergers and acquisitions, 
important corporate investment decisions that have been plagued by both agency 
conflicts and incomplete information.  
As major corporate events, mergers and acquisitions can lead to massive value 
creation or destruction for both the target and the acquirer. The decision-making and 
negotiation process is often long and complex, and requires significant effort from top 
executives and directors in both firms.1 When an interlock forms between the acquirer 
and the target before the merger, it can exacerbate the potential agency conflict and 
change the information flow. In this paper, I identify an interlock between the acquirer 
and the target if one person has been employed by both companies as either officer, 
director, or both within three years prior to the merger announcement, and is still 
employed by at least one firm right before the announcement. Thus, there are two types 
                         
1 For example, Vafeas (1999) studies board meeting frequency and finds that boards meet 
more frequently when shareholders’ interests are in potential danger, for example, during 
mergers, serial divestitures, and replacement for outgoing CEOs. The firm with the 
highest board meeting frequency in his sample was Santa Fe Pacific, which held 24 
meetings during fiscal year of 1994, evaluating a merger with Burlington Northern. An 
average board meets 7.45 times per year. 
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of interlocks: a concurrent interlock and a lagged interlock. The coding decision to use a 
three-year window follows Stuart and Yim (2010) to account for the knowledge and 
personal connection generated from past and current employment.  
Interlocks may exacerbate agency problems for two reasons. First, an interlock 
can lead to conflicts of interest between the two connected firms. By definition, a 
concurrent interlock involves an agent with fiduciary obligations to shareholders at both 
firms. When the two firms are involved in a corporate event such as a merger or 
acquisition, she may take actions that benefit one firm at the expense of the other.2 A 
concurrent interlock also implies that the agent may have stock ownership in both firms. 
She thus has incentive to act in favor of the firm where the value of personal wealth is 
higher, which often means hurting the other firm in terms of division of total surplus. The 
same argument applies to the agent in a lagged interlock. If she keeps her stock 
ownership with the previous employer, she may have incentive to act in favor of the 
previous employer at the expense of the current employer. Another possibility is that the 
personal relationship established with the previous or current employer may also hamper 
the interlocking agent’s judgment and lead to familiarity bias (Ishii and Xuan, 2010).3  
                         
2 This potential conflict of interest does not illegalize transactions with interlocking 
directors. Vedia (1956) discusses transactions between directors and their corporations, 
“In the United States...In cases of interlocking directorates, most of the courts follow the 
rule adopted by the federal courts, according to which contracts entered into by two or 
more corporations through interlocking directors will be upheld if fair and reasonable, 
even when the majority or all of the directors are common to the corporations.” For more 
discussion of the legality of the transaction, see Marron (1931), Davenport (1953), 
Beveridge (1992). I discuss this issue in more details in Section 2.  
3 Technically, the flawed decision-making resulting from familiarity bias is not part of the 
principle-agent framework. However the two mechanisms yield similar predictions.  I 
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Under these influences, the personal connection generated from interlocks makes it easier 
for acquirer executives and directors to collude with target management and to make 
value-destroying acquisitions in pursuit of personal gains, such as empire-building or 
higher compensation (Jensen, 1986; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Harford and Li, 2007). 
In the meantime, interlocked target executives and directors are subject to the same bias 
and incentives when evaluating the offers. They may not resist unfavorable bids hard 
enough; or after accepting the takeover bid, they may negotiate “sweet deals” such as 
excess cash payment or positions in the combined firm at the expense of the target 
shareholders (Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack, 2004; Wulf, 2004).  
The second reason why interlocks exacerbate agency problems is that the personal 
connection established through interlocks gives the agent leverage in the executive or 
director labor market and reduces the expected cost of making potentially bad decisions. 
Early work by Mace (1971) quotes one director: “Here in New York it’s a systems club. 
They are all members of the Brook Club, the Links Club, or the Union League Club. 
Everybody is washing everybody else’s hands.” Bates, Parrino, and Wu (2011) find that 
the number of directorship positions that a target CEO holds is positively correlated with 
her likelihood of obtaining a new job after the takeover. Empirical evidence shows that 
not only the target management and board of directors are displaced after the takeover. 
Lehn and Zhao (2006) find that CEOs are more likely to be replaced for making bad 
acquisitions. In this sense, the post-acquisition employment opportunity would provide 
incentive to both target and acquirer officers. However, interlocks may empower officers 
                                                                         
differentiate the two in Section 5 by introducing acquirer’s governance in the model of 
merger performance and interlock. 
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by enhancing the likelihood of post-acquisition placement and lead to lower quality 
mergers. 
Therefore, agency hypothesis predicts that pre-merger interlocks exacerbate 
agency conflicts and increase the probability that acquirer and/or target firms pursue 
value-destroying mergers. Strong governance may alleviate the agency conflicts 
associated with interlocks and improve deal quality. 
An interlock may provide a countervailing benefit, however, by serving as an 
information conduit between the two firms it connects, which ameliorates the two-sided 
information asymmetry problem in M&A. From an efficiency perspective, the private 
information about the intrinsic value of firm assets can be revealed at a lower cost 
through interlocks. For example, Gulati and Westphal (1999) find that firms are more 
likely to form a joint venture when they share outside directors and learn more about the 
reliability and management capabilities of potential venture partners. Past literature 
mainly focuses on the role of interlocks in facilitating the spread of corporate practices, 
including acquisition activity, adoption of poison pills, golden parachutes, and option 
backdating, etc. (Haunschild, 1993; Davis, 1991; Davis and Greve, 1997; Bizjak, 
Lemmon, and Whitby, 2009). These studies show that interlocks provide decision makers 
an opportunity to observe their peers’ policies and the firsthand consequences. 
Specifically in mergers and acquisitions, acquirers want to learn about the true 
value of targets and make appropriate offers, whereas targets want to estimate the 
potential synergy so as to negotiate for a higher premium in the bargaining process. In 
case of stock payments, targets also need to know the value of acquirers’ equity. These 
uncertainties about the potential merger counterpart result in large search costs. Bruner 
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(2004) indicates that acquirers choose their targets in a search process that usually takes 
several months. Any factor reducing search cost or cost of due diligence is economically 
efficient. Lindsey (2008) documents that strategic alliances are more frequently formed 
among companies sharing a common venture capital investor, and that this effect is 
stronger when contracting problems are more complicated. Gompers and Xuan (2009) 
find that sharing a common venture capital investor helps public acquirers and their 
private targets alleviate information asymmetry, and such acquisitions are associated with 
higher announcement returns. If interlocks indeed facilitate information exchange 
between the two firms, one would expect a similar effect. Hence, the information 
hypothesis predicts that interlocked bids are associated with better performance of the 
combined firm, both at the announcement and in the long run. An acquirer interlocked 
with its target is also more likely to use stock as the payment method. This effect should 
be especially strong for acquirers with high information asymmetry because the benefit of 
having an interlock with the target will be higher if the target is more opaque or the bid 
involves equity payment.   
This paper provides supporting evidence for both the agency hypothesis and the 
information hypothesis of interlocks in mergers and acquisitions. Using a sample of 2,194 
acquisition bids between US public firms from 1991 to 2003, I identify 140 deals in 
which the acquirer and the target are interlocked via top management and board of 
directors. I test the effect of interlocks on merger quality by examining deal 
characteristics, the cross-sectional variation in the announcement returns of acquirers and 
targets, and the post-merger performance of the combined firm.  
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Consistent with the hypothesis that interlocks facilitate information transfer, I find 
interlocked mergers tend to have higher transaction value relative to the acquirer size and 
higher target Tobin’s Q, compared with non- interlocked mergers. These targets also have 
higher R&D expenditures and higher dispersion of analyst forecasts. Moreover, 
interlocked mergers are more likely to use equity as the only payment method, enjoy a 
higher rate of consummation and a lower likelihood of target management hostility. The 
comparative statistics support the argument that interlocks improve information transfer 
between the two firms, and facilitates deals that otherwise may not be completed or even 
not initiated. 
I then investigate how interlocks affect merger outcomes. I find that around the 
announcement day, the three-day cumulative abnormal return for interlocked acquirers is 
1.3% lower than for other acquirers, after controlling for variables that have been shown 
to affect announcement returns. The difference is both statistically and economically 
significant. Following Chen, Harford, and Li (2007), I classify deal quality based on 
extreme market reaction. I find interlocked deals are more likely to be classified as “bad 
deals”, meaning the acquirer three-day announcement CAR is in the bottom quintile. The 
weighted-average return of the acquirer and the target is also significantly lower in 
interlocked deals. No difference is found on the target announcement return or post-
merger performance. Taken together, these results support the agency hypothesis 
predicting that interlocks lead to value-destroying deals, and are consistent with Ishii and 
Xuan (2010).  
To investigate whether governance alleviates the negative effect caused by 
interlock-related agency problems, I include the interaction term between interlock and 
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acquirer governance. Using director ownership as a measure of acquirers’ governance 
following Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby (2009), I find that the coefficient of the 
interaction term is significantly positive, indicating that when the acquirer is better 
governed, the existence of interlock is associated with higher deal quality. This evidence 
strongly supports the agency hypothesis, predicting that interlocks lead to value-
destroying acquisitions on average, whereas good governance of acquirers mitigates the 
negative impact.  
I further test the information hypothesis by including interaction terms between 
interlock and measures of information asymmetry. According to the hypothesis that 
interlocks help alleviate information asymmetry problems, when the target is opaque to 
the acquirer and information about the target is more valuable, the benefit of interlock is 
more pronounced. Consistent with this prediction, I find the interaction term between 
information asymmetry measures and interlock is significantly positive. If the target is 
above the industry median in terms of analyst forecasts dispersion or R&D expenditures, 
the acquirers interlocked with such targets gain 3.8% more than the non-interlocked 
acquirers over the three-day announcement window. The corresponding long-run effect is 
even more pronounced. 
 In addition to this wealth effect, the information hypothesis predicts a higher 
likelihood of using the acquirer’s stock as the payment method. If an interlock reduces 
uncertainty about the acquirer’s stock value, the target is more willing to accept a 
contingent payment, hence demanding a lower acquisition premium in stock bids 
compared with non-interlocked targets. Therefore in the equilibrium, there should be 
more stock payments in interlocked deals, especially when the acquirer’s stock value is 
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more opaque. Using logistic regressions, I find that the existence of an interlock increases 
the likelihood of stock payment by 15%. For acquirers with high dispersion in analyst 
forecasts, the marginal effect of interlock is as high as 23%. 
In addition to the analysis of merger performance, I examine the relation between 
interlocks and other characteristics of M&A. I find that the fraction of total merger 
surplus allocated to the acquirer is positively correlated with the interlocking agent’s 
ownership in the acquirer relative to her ownership in the target. This finding supports the 
hypothesis that an interlocking agent acts in favor of the firm where the value of personal 
wealth is higher. 
An acquisition is also more likely to be initiated if two firms are interlocked and 
such transactions are more likely to be consummated. If there are multiple bids, the 
interlocked bidder has a higher chance of winning the auction. This additional evidence 
does not differentiate the two hypotheses. On the one hand, the information hypothesis 
predicts that interlocks facilitate transactions that otherwise may not be initiated or 
completed due to high search costs or high standards of due diligence. On the other hand, 
an interlocking agent may want to maximize her personal interest by facilitating a merger 
with an interlocked firm. The higher likelihood of winning an auction for an interlocked 
bidder may result from better knowledge of the target asset, or simply from favoritism of 
the target over other bidders.  
1.1 Literature review  
This paper contributes to a growing literature of board interlocks that links 
financial activities and outcomes to managerial behavior. Previous literature has 
investigated the role of interlocks as an information conduit by examining the spread of 
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corporate practice through board interlocks, such as acquisition activity (Haunschild, 
1993), adoption of poison pills (Davis, 1991), golden parachutes (Davis and Greve, 
1997), CEO option backdating (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby, 2009), being targeted in a 
take-private transaction (Stuart and Yim, 2010), and so on. The empirical work on the 
other side of the story has mainly focused on the diminishing board independence 
associated with mutual interlocks, in which an officer of one firm sits on another firm’s 
board and vice versa. Research has shown that CEOs earn significantly higher 
compensation when they are mutually interlocked (Hallock, 1997), when the board of the 
firm is mutually interlocked with another board (Fich and White, 2003), and when there 
is a “cozy” relationship between the top management and outside directors (Larcker, 
Richardson, Seary, and Tuna, 2005). The two hypotheses regarding agency cost and the 
information benefit of interlocks are not mutually exclusive but have completely different 
predictions on the wealth effect of interlocks. Mergers and acquisitions provide a perfect 
context to test the two hypotheses and to do a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. This 
study finds support for both hypotheses. 
This paper also contributes to the M&A literature. Past research has shown that 
various deal or firm characteristics explain the cross-sectional variation in short-term and 
long-term wealth effects to both targets and acquirers. For example, Bates and Lemmon 
(2003) find target announcement CARs are higher in deals with target termination fee 
provisions, and lower in deals with acquirer fee provisions. Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) 
show that concentrated holdings by independent long-term institutional investors lead to 
better post-merger stock and operating performance. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) find 
that significantly lower acquirer CARs are associated with weaker corporate governance 
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such as anti-takeover provisions, CEO-chair duality, or operating in less competitive 
industries. This paper adds to this literature by showing the role that top management and 
director interlocks play in the M&A setting. This is a potentially interesting research 
question because the decision-making and negotiation process of M&A is often long and 
complex, and requires tremendous effort from top executives and directors in both the 
target and the acquirer. Vafeas (1999) finds that board of directors meet more frequently 
when shareholders’ interests are in potential danger, for example, during mergers, serial 
divestitures, and replacement for outgoing CEOs. In his sample, the firm with the highest 
board meeting frequency was Santa Fe Pacific, which held 24 meetings during fiscal year 
of 1994, evaluating a merger with Burlington Northern, more than three times of the 
average annual frequency of board meeting (7.45). 
This paper is most related to Ishii and Xuan (2010), who test the impact of social 
ties between targets and acquirers on merger outcomes. Instead of looking at explicit 
interlock between the two firms, they use educational background and past employment 
as a proxy for social ties. One may regard interlocks as a special form of social ties with a 
stronger connection between the two firms. More importantly, interlocks imply severe 
agency issues resulting from the dual agency role of the interlocking director or officer, 
whereas social ties involving two agents with same educational background or past 
employment may only result in cognitive bias. Another difference between the two 
papers is that I investigate the post-merger operating performance of the combined firm, 
which complements the announcement abnormal return as a measure of merger quality. 
In addition to the univariate analysis applied in Ishii and Xuan (2010), I regress post-
merger performance measures on a set of commonly accepted explanatory variables 
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including measures of acquirer governance, target information asymmetry, and their 
interaction terms with interlock. The results indicate that the impact of interlock on post-
merger performance is conditional on corporate governance and information asymmetry.  
Several other papers study the relation between board connections and M&A. For 
example, Davis and Stout (1992) and Fligstein and Brantley (1992) find no evidence of 
the presence of a banker on board leading to a higher likelihood of engaging in merger 
activities, either as the target or the acquirer. Haunschild (1993) finds that firms’ 
acquisition behavior is impacted by the practice of the firms that they are linked to, that 
is, if a firm is interlocked to another firm that recently engaged in acquisitions, it is more 
likely to engage in acquisitions afterwards. Schonlau and Singh (2009) find that acquirers 
with well-connected boards are associated with better post-merger performance 
compared with those with less-connected boards. All of these studies suggest that board 
connections affect firms’ decision to acquire, the choice of their target, and the outcome 
of the merger. This paper is different from these studies in the sense that it specifically 
focuses on the interlocks between the acquirer and its target instead of a general 
connection between the acquirer and any other firm, therefore provides explicit evidence 
of the role that interlocks play in corporate activities. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of 
current judicial attitude on transactions between interlocked firms, and an anecdotal 
example. Section 3 describes the data and construction of variables. Section 4 presents 
the results from empirical tests on the relation between interlocks and merger 
performance and characteristics. Section 5 examines the above relation conditional on 
corporate governance and information asymmetry. Section 6 presents additional 
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empirical evidence including the relation between interlocks and probability of 
acquisition, and deal completion. Section 7 concludes. 
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Chapter 2: Legal Treatment Of Transactions Between Corporations With Common 
Directors 
2.1. Legal treatment of self-dealing transactions 
113 out of the 140 interlocks in the sample are concurrent, which implies that the 
interlocking agent has a fiduciary obligation to both acquirer and target shareholders at 
the time of merger announcement. Different states have different clauses with regard to 
the legitimacy of these so called “self-dealing” transactions between corporations sharing 
common directors.  
Regulators try to protect shareholders from potential self-dealing of the 
interlocking agents, but at the same time, they do not want to constrain companies from 
seeking value-enhancing deals through managerial connections. Stuart and Yim (2010) 
has shown that on average, a US public firm is interlocked to eight other firms, and the 
connection can be beneficial to both companies. The attitude of legislators is perhaps best 
demonstrated in the case of Bowman v. Gum, Inc. (1937). The court decided that an 
interlocking director is not disqualified by his adverse interest per se, but the conflict of 
interest will “subject his actions to the closest scrutiny and rescission for breach of his 
fiduciary relation” (Lane, 1938).4 In general, a contract between corporations with 
common directors is not void or voidable if it is fair and reasonable, although the burden 
                         
4 As Vedia (1956) discusses transactions between directors and their corporations, “In 
cases of interlocking directorates, most of the courts follow the rule adopted by the 
federal courts, according to which contracts entered into by two or more corporations 
through interlocking directors will be upheld if fair and reasonable, even when the 
majority or all of the directors are common to the corporations. In the United States, it 
has become customary to insert in the articles of incorporation or by-laws a special 
provision permitting contracts between a director and his corporation or between 
corporations having interlocking directors.”  
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of proving fairness lies on the party seeking to uphold the contract (Davenport, 1953; 
Vedia, 1956).5 The Corporation Law in Delaware, California and Texas provides three 
ways of validation for such transactions: a majority vote by disinterested directors, a 
majority vote by fully informed shareholders, and proof of fairness. 
2.2 The MKS/ASTeX acquisition  
The acquisition of Applied Science & Technology (hereinafter ASTeX) by MKS 
Instruments Inc. (hereinafter MKS) in year 2000 illustrates how the interlocking agent 
influences the merger process, and how the acquirer and the target take actions to avoid 
litigation. MKS, the acquirer, elaborated the background of the transaction in a filing 
amendment6 after the merger was announced.  
Mr. John R. Bertucci was the CEO and chairman of the board of MKS in 2000. 
He had also served on the board of directors of ASTeX since 1994. On July 12, 2000, Mr. 
Bertucci met with Merrill Lynch as the MKS CEO to discuss the consolidation in the 
industry. On July 20, 2000, one week after the meeting, the investment bank came back 
to MKS to discuss the strategic fit between MKS and ASTeX, where Mr. Bertucci served 
as a director. In August and September, ASTeX’s board of directors, other than Mr. 
Bertucci, held special meetings to review the merger, discuss other possible buyers, and 
review the final terms of the merger agreement. On October 2, 2000, ASTeX and MKS 
entered into the merger agreement. 
                         
5 In some states such as California, the rule is even more liberal. For example, 
interlocking directors are permitted to vote, and the statute further leaves the burden of 
proof on the complaint, usually a minority shareholder. (Davenport, 1953) 
6 From EDGAR Online the SEC filing: S-4/A filed by MKS, 2000-12-13.  
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There are three points to be noticed in this case. First, the extremely short interval 
between Mr. Bertucci’s meeting with the investment bank and the proposal of ASTeX as 
the potential target implies his contribution in initiating the deal between the two firms. 
Given that there are 103 firms with the same 4-digit SIC code as ASTeX in the year 
2000, the proposal of ASTeX does not seem to be a coincidence. Second, this whole 
process from the initial talk to final merger agreement took less than three months, a very 
short search process compared with the example of private negotiation between targets 
and acquirers in Boone and Mulherin (2007). In that example, it took the two firms 
almost a whole year, from when the CEOs of BankBoston met with the CEO of Fleet 
Financial to discuss a possible merger (April 1, 1998), to the signing of the final merger 
agreement (March 14, 1999). The presence of no other bid on the target implies the 
interlock may have prevented other “outside” bidders from competing.  
Lastly, Mr. Bertucci stepped aside by recusing himself from crucial target board 
meetings. As a matter of fact, both the acquirer and the target made explicit claims in the 
amendment as follows. The section of “Interests of executive officers and directors of 
MKS in the merger” reads in part, “In considering the fairness of the merger to the MKS 
stockholders, the MKS board of directors took into account Mr. Bertucci's interests. 
Some of these interests are different from, or in addition to, the interests of MKS 
stockholders generally in the issuance of MKS common stock in the merger.” In other 
words, the acquirer board claimed to be aware of the interlocking agent’s potential gain 
from the transaction. Further, the board believed that the acquisition was good for the 
acquirer shareholders and approved the acquisition. On the other hand, the target 
emphasized that “ASTeX’s board of directors, with Mr. Bertucci not participating, has 
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unanimously approved the merger agreement and the merger and believes that the terms 
of the merger agreement are fair to, and that the merger is in the best interests of ASTeX 
and its stockholders.”  
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Chapter 3: Data Description and Construction of the Interlock Variable 
3.1 M&A sample formation 
I start with a sample of 9,657 bids with a US public target from the Mergers and 
Acquisitions Database maintained by SDC. Because the date range for management and 
board data in Compact Disclosure is 1988–2004, I require the bids to be announced 
between 1991 and 2003. The status of the deal is either completed or withdrawn. Any bid 
is excluded if coded as a divestiture, acquisition of remaining or partial interest, buyback, 
recapitalization, or exchange offer. To focus on change-in-control events, I further 
require that the acquirer holds 20% or less of the target stock prior to the announcement, 
and seeks 50% or more, leading to 9,191 bids. Both target and acquirer are then matched 
with CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases for stock return and financial information, 
which reduces the sample size to 3,852. 
3,324 of these bids have both target and acquirer covered by Compact Disclosure. 
I further dropped the reverse mergers and the transactions in which the acquirer is in the 
financial industry (SIC between 6000 and 6999) but the target is not. The latter restriction 
is imposed to exclude cases in which the acquirer is the primary creditor of the target, and 
therefore a banker from the acquirer naturally sits on the target’s board to monitor. To 
have a significant impact on the acquirer’s value and performance, the relative deal value 
must be at least 5%, calculated as the ratio of the transaction value relative to the 
acquirer’s market equity 20 days prior to the announcement date. The final sample 
consists of 2,194 bids. 
Panel A in Table 1 shows the distribution of the sample bids by announcement 
year. Between 1991 and 2003, the number of bids increased with the rising of the 
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economy and dropped at the end of the 1990s. This trend is consistent with the 
observation in other studies, such as Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) and Chen, 
Harford, and Li (2007). Of the full sample of 2,194 bids (1,738 completed and 456 
withdrawn), 140 bids are interlocked, without a significant time trend in the distribution 
across years. The highest percentage of interlocked bids is 11% and lowest is 2% for 
1993 and 1992, respectively. Panel B presents the distribution by target’s industry, 
defined by Fama-French 12-industry classifications. The industries with the highest 
percentage of interlocked bids are Telecommunication and Health (11% and 10%, 
respectively), whereas the industries with the lowest interlock ratios are Chemicals and 
Finance (3%). As with the financial sector, Utility is also a heavily regulated industry and 
has the second-lowest interlock ratio of 4%.  
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Table 1: Distribution of bids by year and industry 
 
This table presents the distribution of sample bids by announcement year and by target’s 
industry. All 2,194 bids are announced between 1991 and 2003, with transaction value at 
least 5% of the acquirer’s market value of equity. Both the acquirer and target are US 
public firms covered by CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and Compact Disclosure. Interlocked 
bids are defined as those with at least one person employed by both firms as either 
director or top executive within 3 years before the announcement of the bid. The target’s 
industry is defined by the Fama-French 12-industry classifications. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of bids by year 
Year # of bids 
# of 
interlocked 
bids 
% of 
interlocked 
bids 
1991 58 4 7% 
1992 47 1 2% 
1993 70 8 11% 
1994 139 5 4% 
1995 206 12 6% 
1996 196 11 6% 
1997 291 20 7% 
1998 302 15 5% 
1999 277 18 6% 
2000 231 22 10% 
2001 140 12 7% 
2002 91 6 7% 
2003 120 6 5% 
sum 2,194 140 6.38% 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of bids by target’s industry  
Industry # of bids 
# of 
interlocked 
bids 
% of 
interlocked 
bids 
1. NonDurables  74 6 8% 
2. Durables  39 3 8% 
3. Manufacturing  177 12 7% 
4. Energy 87 4 5% 
5. Chemicals and Allied 37 1 3% 
6. Business Equipment  419 28 7% 
7. Telecommunication 97 11 11% 
8. Utilities 77 3 4% 
9. Wholesale, Retail 175 12 7% 
10. Health 214 21 10% 
11. Finance 565 17 3% 
12. Other 233 22 9% 
sum 2,194 140 6.38% 
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3.2 Interlock variable 
The source of data on top management and board is the Compact Disclosure 
(a.k.a. Compact D/SEC) database. Compact Disclosure provides financial and 
management information extracted from 10-K and other SEC filings for over 7,000 firms. 
Both firms are matched for a full list of executive officers and board directors with name, 
age, and title within the company. On average, a target firm has 8.4 executives and 8.3 
directors in a sample year, whereas an acquirer has 9.9 executives and 10 directors.  
An interlock is identified if one person has been employed by both companies as 
either officer, director, or both within three years prior to the announcement (year t), and 
is still employed by either acquirer or target in the year right before the merger (year t-1). 
For the primary measure of interlocks, I use an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the two 
firms share at least one common director/officer in the three-year window. Using the 
number of interlocking agents yields similar results. Thus there are two types of 
interlocks: concurrent interlocks and lagged interlocks. In other words, the interlocking 
agent doesn’t necessarily serve at both firms at the merger announcement. For example, 
an interlocking agent may be a target director until year t-2 and serve as the CFO of the 
acquirer the whole time. The coding decision of three-year window follows Stuart and 
Yim (2010). The rationale is in line with the assumption that a director or executive 
should carry with her all the knowledge, personal experience, and connections from the 
previous employer, and further impact any acquisition decision involving the firm, even 
though the link between the previous employer and her current employer is not 
contemporaneous. Another underlying assumption is that past experiences will gradually 
lose relevancy to her current employer; that is, the further away the link the smaller the 
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relevancy is. The knowledge and connections with the old employer from three years ago 
are clearly more relevant than those from 10 years ago. Treating them as the same 
introduces noise to the measure. The results are robust to the use of 2-year or 4-year 
windows, yet a bit weaker. 
Table 2 shows the distribution of bids by the number of interlocks. Among all 
2,194 bids, 140 (6.38%) have at least one interlock. The remaining 2,054 bids are non-
interlocked. I exclude bids with more than three interlocks, in which case the acquirer and 
target are usually related in some other way, such as the target being the acquirer’s block 
holder or strategic alliance. This is not the interest of this paper since the existing 
fundamental relationship between two firms might be the primary factor for both 
information transfer and agency costs. Director interlock is more of a byproduct in this 
case. The results in this paper are not sensitive to the inclusion of these bids. 
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Table 2: Distribution of bids by number of interlocks between the target and acquirer 
 
This table presents the distribution of bids by the number of interlocks. An interlock is 
defined as one person employed by both target and acquirer as either director or top 
executive within 3 years before the announcement of the bid. Presented first is the 
number of bids with a specific number of interlocks, followed by the percentage in all 
bids. Among all 2,194 bids, 140 have at least 1 interlock, collectively 6.38% of the full 
sample. The remaining 2,054 bids are non-interlocked. 
 
# of 
interlocks Frequency Percentage 
   
1 103 4.69 
2 34 1.55 
3 3 0.14 
sum 140 6.38 
   
0 2,054 93.62 
sum 2,194 100 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Results 
In this section, I present results from both univariate analysis and multiple 
regression analysis that investigate the relation between interlock and merger 
characteristics, as well as the wealth effect of interlock in terms of short-run and long-run 
merger performance. 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics, comparing the subsample of 140 
interlocked bids to the subsample of 2,054 non-interlocked bids. All variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles except the indicator variables. Dollar values 
have been inflation-adjusted using year 2000 as the base. Mergers with interlocks have 
smaller targets and acquirers but higher relative deal value, calculated as the transaction 
value divided by the acquirer’s market capitalization 20 days prior to the announcement 
date. Interlocked bids also have higher pre-announcement Q of the target. The Tobin’s Q 
net of the industry median is 0.6 for interlocked bids, and only 0.22 for non-interlocked 
bids. Smith and Watts (1992) use market-to-book ratio of assets as a proxy for higher 
degree of the firm’s growth opportunities. And target’s pre-announcement growth 
opportunities are assumed to be private information, thus opaque to the acquirer (Bates 
and Lemmon, 2003). The higher pre-announcement Q of the target, together with the 
higher relative deal value, implies a more complex transaction and more opacity in the 
acquirer’s perspective about the value of the target.  
Acquirers interlocked to targets are more likely to use equity as the payment 
method and less likely to use cash. There are 60% (9%) interlocked bids solely paid by 
equity (cash), compared with 50% (16%) of non-interlocked bids. The choice of equity as 
 
29
payment requires the acquirer to disclose more about the synergy and value of the 
combined firm (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004). In addition, an interlocked bid 
is also more likely to be received as friendly by target management, to be completed, and 
to have a shorter interval between announcement and deal completion. All of these 
characteristics are significantly different at the 1% or 5% level, except that target hostility 
between the two groups is different at 10%. These findings imply the existence of more 
severe information asymmetry between the target and acquirer or a higher cost of the 
asymmetry when the two firms are interlocked, and therefore support the information 
hypothesis. The interlocking agent efficiently transfers information between the two 
firms and facilitates the deal that otherwise may not be completed or even initiated.  
With respect to merger performance, announcement CARs for target and acquirer 
in non-interlocked bids are comparable to previous studies, 19% and -2.1%, respectively. 
Acquirers in interlocked bids, however, experience a lower CAR of -4%, an 
economically significant discount. Although CAR is a straightforward and market-based 
estimate of the wealth effect, and hence commonly used in M&A studies, Chen, Harford, 
and Li (2007) argue that additional measures of deal quality are necessary. On the one 
hand, due to all the uncertainty over merger surplus, distribution of surplus, and 
resolution of the transaction to the outside investors, the stock price reactions to both 
firms at the announcement could be rather noisy (Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer, and Noah, 
2005). On the other hand, bids that receive significantly negative reactions are likely to 
be truly bad deals (Paul, 2007). Therefore, to complement the three-day CAR, this paper 
includes post-merger stock and operating performance measures, and constructs indicator 
variables to capture extreme stock reactions. Specifically, I follow Chen, Harford, and Li 
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(2007) in using the top and bottom quintiles of acquirer’s three-day CAR to define good 
deals versus bad ones. Good Deal is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the 
acquirer’s three-day CAR is in the top quintile, and zero otherwise. Bad Deal is defined 
analogously for the bottom quintile. ΔROA is calculated as the difference between the 
post-merger three-year average ROA and the pre-merger three-year average. Both ROA 
and Q in this paper are net of the median of all firms with same two-digit SIC code. 
Besides the lower CARs of acquirers, Table 3 shows that interlocked bids are 
associated with a significantly higher likelihood of being an extremely bad deal but with 
a larger increase in ROA. The announcement effects indicate that the market reacts 
negatively to the announcement of acquisitions with an interlock between target and 
acquirer. Section 5 explains the seemingly inconsistent evidence on ΔROA with further 
investigation. 
In general, the univariate analysis shows that interlocked deals are associated with 
firm and bid characteristics that indicate information asymmetry between bidder and 
target, but also involve acquisitions of lower quality.
 
31
Table 3: Sample summary statistics  
 
This table presents summary statistics for the characteristics of 2,194 bids as well as the 
targets and acquirers. An interlocked bid is one with at least one person employed by 
both target and acquirer as either director or top executive within 3 years before the 
announcement of the bid. Of the 2,194 bids, 140 (6.38%) are interlocked. Target and 
acquirer characteristics are computed using firm data from the fiscal year immediately 
preceding the announcement date. Leverage is book value of debt divided by book value 
of asset (Compustat Data Item 6). Book Debt is defined as the sum of long-term debt 
(Item 9) and debt in current liabilities (Item 34). Cash flow is operating income before 
depreciation (Item 13). Tobin’s Q is proxied by the market-to-book assets ratio, defined 
as the book assets (Item 6) plus the market value of equity (Item 199 times Item 25) 
minus book equity (Item 60) then divided by the book assets. ROA is Operating Income 
before Depreciation (Item 13) over lagged book asset. Both Q and ROA presented here 
and used in regressions are the net of the industry median. R&D is R&D expenditure 
(Item 46) divided by book asset. STDDEV of forecasts is the standard deviation of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S. Relative Deal Value is transaction value 
divided by equity market capitalization of the acquirer at 20 days prior to announcement 
date. Length is the number of days between the announcement date and the effective date. 
Toehold is the percent of ownership in the target by the acquirer at the announcement. 
Final premium is calculated as the final bid price per share from SDC divided by the 
target’s stock price 42 trading days prior to announcement, less one. Diversifying Merger 
is an indicator variable equal to one if the target and the bidder are from different 
industries, industry defined by two-digit SIC code. MultipleBid is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the auction has multiple bids. An auction is composed of all bids for a 
target beginning with the first observed bid and including any successive bids made 
within 365 calendar days of a prior announcement. All Stock (All Cash) is an indicator 
variable equal to one if target shareholders are paid 100% by bidder’s equity (cash). 
Tender Offer is an indicator variable equal to one if the bid is a tender offer. Complete is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the bid is completed. Hostile is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the bid is classified as “Hostile” in SDC. Target and acquirer 3-day CARs 
are calculated over the event window [-1, +1]. Combined 3-day CAR is the average of 
target and acquirer CARs weighted by their market cap of two days prior to 
announcement. Good (Bad) Deal is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the 
acquirer’s 3-day CAR is in the top (bottom) quintile, and zero otherwise. All variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles except indicator variables. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance between the interlocked and non-interlocked subsamples at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
  Mean  Median  
  
Non-interlocked 
bid 
Interlocked 
bid  
Non-interlocked 
bid 
Interlocked 
bid  
Frequency 2054 140  2054 140  
Acquirer Characteristics      
Book Asset 7841 6551  1202 469 *** 
Leverage 0.213 0.214  0.189 0.155  
CF to Asset 0.089 0.061 ** 0.100 0.093  
Q 0.624 0.868  0.069 0.072  
R&D 0.077 0.129 *** 0.036 0.042  
STDDEV of Forecasts 0.032 0.034  0.025 0.03  
Target Characteristics       
Book Asset 2258 1657  296 153 *** 
Leverage 0.209 0.200  0.163 0.135  
CF to Asset 0.057 0.008 *** 0.085 0.072 * 
Q 0.215 0.603 *** -0.017 0.036  
R&D 0.044 0.084 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 
STDDEV of Forecasts 0.031 0.035 ** 0.025 0.03 * 
Merger Performance Measures      
Target 3-day CAR 0.190 0.176  0.155 0.136  
Acquirer 3-day CAR -0.021 -0.041 *** -0.018 -0.031 * 
Combined 3-day CAR 0.019 0.003 ** 0.013 0.004  
Good Deal 20% 18%     
Bad Deal 19% 36% ***    
Δ ROA 0.029 0.085 ** 0.002 0.006  
Bid Characteristics       
Deal Value 1723 2188  276 245  
Relative Deal Value 46% 51% * 36% 46% * 
Length 143 136  125 114 ** 
Initial Premium 49% 50%  40% 39%  
Final Premium 49% 47%  41% 39%  
AllStock 50% 60% **    
AllCash 16% 9% **    
Diversifying Merger 24% 24%     
Complete 82% 89% **    
Hostile 5% 1% *    
Tender Offer 15% 13%     
Toehold 4% 6%     
MultipleBid 10% 6%     
 
33
4.2 Multiple regression analysis 
In this section I consider whether the existence of interlock impacts the 
announcement performance of acquirers and targets and the post-acquisition 
performance.  The cross-sectional regressions include a key variable of interlocks 
(hereinafter INTERLOCK), an indicator variable equal to one if there is one or more 
interlocks between the acquirer and the target, and zero otherwise. Control variables are 
firm and bid characteristics that are commonly accepted as influencing merger 
performance, including firm size measured by logged book asset, Q, leverage, cash flow 
to asset, relative deal value, indicator variables of 100% payment in equity or cash, and 
an indicator variable equal to one if the target and the acquirer are in the same industry 
defined by two-digit SIC code. The announcement return regressions use the entire 
sample of 2,194 bids, whereas the regression of post-merger performance uses 1,738 
completed change-in-control transactions. All regressions include year and industry fixed 
effects to control for potential systematic differences in time or industry.  
Table 4 presents cross-sectional regressions of different performance measures. 
Models 1-4 are OLS regressions, whereas Models 5-6 are logistic regressions modeling 
the likelihood that acquirer announcement abnormal return falls in the top (bottom) 
quintile of the sample. The findings are consistent with the agency hypothesis; that is, 
interlocks lead to value destruction in the acquirer. In Column I, the coefficient on 
INTERLOCK is -0.013 in the model with the acquirer’s three-day announcement 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) as the dependent variable. In other words, on average, 
an interlocked acquirer receives a 1.3% lower return than a non-interlocked acquirer, 
which is a discount of almost 70% of the average unconditional CAR (-2.1%), hence is of 
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economic significance. In addition, the likelihood that the acquirer’s CAR is ranked in 
the bottom quintile, defined as a “bad deal” in Chen, Harford, and Li (2007), is also 
higher if the acquirer is interlocked to target through a director or executive. The 
marginal effect of interlock is 10.5% (not tabulated), a striking impact given that the 
unconditional likelihood of being ranked in the bottom quintile is 20% by definition. This 
result suggests that the market response to an interlocked acquisition is more likely to be 
extremely bad, and is complementary to the test of acquirer abnormal return.  
An alternative explanation of this negative impact of interlock on acquirer 
announcement return is the wealth transfer between acquirers and targets, a notion in the 
M&A literature that acquirers overpay targets due to hubris or personal objectives (e.g. 
Roll (1986), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Hietala, Kaplan, and Robinson (2003)). 
To test this alternative hypothesis, the second column shows the effect of interlocks on 
targets’ CAR. Consistent with Ishii and Xuan (2010), the coefficient on INTERLOCK is 
insignificant in the target specification, suggesting that the negative impact of interlock 
on acquirer performance is not due to the acquirer overpaying the target. This finding is 
further confirmed in the unreported regression of the acquisition premium on interlock, 
final acquisition premium calculated as the final bid price per share from SDC divided by 
the target’s stock price 42 trading days prior to announcement, less one. The coefficient 
on INTERLOCK is -0.027, negative and statistically insignificant from zero (not 
tabulated). If the existence of an interlock makes the acquirer overpay the target due to 
self-dealing incentives or familiarity bias, the premium should be higher and the target 
should have a higher announcement return, ceteris paribus. The existence of interlocks 
does not appear to impact post-merger performance. The coefficient on INTERLOCK in 
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regression of ΔROA is statistically insignificant. In general, the result is consistent with 
the notion that interlocks lead to value-reducing acquisitions for acquirers.  
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Table 4: Cross-sectional regression analysis of merger performance and interlock 
 
This table presents cross-sectional regression results. The announcement return 
regressions use the whole sample of 2,194 bids, whereas post-merger performance 
regressions use the 1,738 completed deals. Target, acquirer, and combined firm 3-day 
CARs (CAR3) are calculated over the event window [-1, +1]. Good (Bad) Deal is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of one if the acquirer’s 3-day CAR is in the top 
(bottom) quintile, and zero otherwise. ΔROA is the difference between the post-merger 
3-year average of industry-adjusted ROA and the pre-merger corresponding measure. 
INTERLOCK is an indicator variable equal to one if there is at least one person 
employed by both target and bidder as either director or top executive within 3 years 
before the announcement, and zero otherwise. Target and acquirer characteristics are 
computed using firm data from the fiscal year immediately preceding the announcement 
date. Tobin’s Q is proxied by the industry-adjusted market-to-book assets ratio. Leverage 
is book value of debt divided by book asset. Cash flow is operating income before 
depreciation (Item 13). Relative Deal Value is transaction value divided by equity market 
capitalization of the acquirer at 20 days prior to announcement date. Diversifying Merger, 
All Stock, and All Cash are indicator variables equal to one for bids with targets in 
different industries defined by the 2-digit SIC code from the acquirer, if only equity is 
used to pay for the acquisition or if only cash is used, respectively, and zero otherwise. 
Corresponding p-value is reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
 
Acquirer 
CAR3 
Target 
CAR3 
Combined 
CAR3 ΔROA Good Deal Bad Deal 
INTERLOCK -0.013 * 0.008  -0.013 * 0.001  -0.142  0.669 *** 
 (0.059)  (0.663)  (0.085)  (0.971)  (0.551)  (0.002)  
Log asset -0.002 ** -0.005 * 0.000  0.004  -0.078 ** -0.007  
 (0.035)  (0.092)  (0.968)  (0.399)  (0.032)  (0.852)  
Q -0.004 *** -0.016 *** -0.003 *** 0.019 *** -0.011  0.080 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.732)  (0.008)  
Leverage 0.005  0.025  -0.005  -0.078  0.085  -0.546  
 (0.668)  (0.379)  (0.675)  (0.124)  (0.813)  (0.155)  
CF to Asset -0.033 ** 0.039  -0.012  -0.953 *** -1.031 ** 0.301  
 (0.017)  (0.153)  (0.447)  (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.488)  
-0.032 *** -0.095 *** 0.046 *** 0.041 * 0.248  1.838 *** Relative Deal 
Value (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.098)  (0.184)  (0.000)  
All Stock -0.016 *** -0.031 *** -0.021 *** 0.034 * -0.090  0.746 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.056)  (0.520)  (0.000)  
All Cash 0.023 *** 0.050 *** 0.035 *** 0.025  0.621 *** -0.796 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.291)  (0.000)  (0.002)  
0.003  -0.006  -0.001  0.026  0.040  -0.175  Diversifying 
Merger (0.495)  (0.603)  (0.842)  (0.178)  (0.773)  (0.251)  
Year and Industry 
fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 7.6%  9.0%  9.4%  20.4%  7.9%  16.8%  
Num of obs. 2,194   2,124   2,124   1,738   2,194   2,194   
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Chapter 5: Evidence on the Two Hypotheses 
If an interlock between the acquirer and target leads to a value-destroying merger 
decision due to an agent’s self-dealing behavior or cognitive bias, the acquirer’s pre-
merger governance should alleviate the agency cost by preventing low-quality deals from 
being announced or completed. On the other hand, the cross-sectional variation of the 
target’s opacity would also affect the relationship between merger performance and 
interlock if interlock efficiently transfers information from target to acquirer. Besides the 
wealth effect, the information hypothesis also predicts a higher likelihood of observing 
stock as the method of payment. If an interlock reduces the information asymmetry 
between the two firms, the target is more willing to accept a contingent payment, ceteris 
paribus. This positive impact should be higher if the acquirer’s stock value is more 
opaque. This section investigates these predictions of the two hypotheses. 
5.1 Wealth effect of interlock and corporate governance in acquirer  
Following Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby (2009), I use director ownership as a 
proxy of corporate governance. Intuitively, if the stock and option ownership of the board 
as a group is high, the directors’ interests are well aligned with the shareholders’ and the 
directors will therefore have a stronger incentive to monitor managerial behavior, 
including acquisition activity. Specifically, I construct an indicator variable equal to one 
if the pre-merger director ownership in the acquiring firm is above the annual industry 
median, and zero otherwise. The data on director ownership come from a combination of 
Compact Disclosure and IRRC, the availability of which reduces the sample size to 
1,507. The use of an indicator variable follows the measure of governance in Harford and 
Li (2007), who use an indicator variable, Strong Board, set equal to one for firms in 
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which CEOs’ tenure is below the annual median. The purpose is to mitigate the noise 
contained in the excessive variation of director ownership or CEO tenure. All results hold 
if the continuous level of director ownership is used instead. 
Table 5 presents the results from OLS regressions of different measures of merger 
performance on the key variable and control variables. The setting is similar to baseline 
models presented in Table 4, with two key variables introduced: the pre-merger acquirer 
governance and the interaction term between interlock and governance. The coefficients 
on the interaction term are significantly positive in regressions of the acquirer’s CAR, 
combined CAR, and accounting performance ΔROA. When the acquirer is strongly 
governed, an interlocked deal is associated with a higher acquirer CAR (6.9%) and higher 
combined CAR (5%), compared with a non-interlocked deal. Notably, the coefficient on 
the interaction term is 0.144 in the model of change in ROA, significant both statistically 
and economically, which is more than four times as high as the unconditional sample 
mean (0.033). Compared with the insignificant coefficient on INTERLOCK without 
controlling for acquirer governance, this result means the interlocked acquisition leads to 
a dramatic increase in operating performance only when the incentives of the board of 
director are well aligned. 
The positive impacts on stock and operating performance can result from 
synergies of acquisitions that may not be initiated without an interlock due to asymmetric 
information. In contrast, a weakly governed acquirer suffers more when interlocked with 
the target. The acquirer’s CAR, combined CAR, and ΔROA are, respectively, 5.7%, 
5.2%, and 0.09 lower than those in a non-interlocked deal. This finding is consistent with 
the prediction of the agency hypothesis that if the board fails to monitor the acquisition 
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behavior, the deal facilitated by the interlocked person destroys value. The estimates from 
the logit regression with Good Deal and Bad Deal indicator variables as the dependent 
variable are consistent with that of acquirer’s CAR. The evidence that good pre-merger 
governance of the acquirer mitigates the negative wealth effect of interlocks supports the 
agency hypothesis.7  
                         
7 Results are generally robust to the use of G-index as the proxy for corporate 
governance, but slightly weaker. 
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Table 5: The effect of corporate governance on wealth effect of interlock 
 
This table presents cross-sectional regression results controlling for corporate 
governance. The announcement return regressions use the whole sample of 2,194 bids, 
whereas post-merger performance regressions use the 1,738 completed deals. Target, 
acquirer, and combined firm 3-day CARs (CAR3) are calculated over the event window 
[-1, +1]. Good (Bad) Deal is an indicator variable equal to one if acquirer’s 3-day CAR is 
in the top (bottom) quintile, and zero otherwise. ΔROA is the difference between the 
post-merger 3-year average of industry-adjusted ROA and the pre-merger corresponding 
measure. INTERLOCK is an indicator variable equal to one if there is at least one person 
employed by both target and bidder as either director or top executive within 3 years 
before the announcement, and zero otherwise. DirOwn is an indicator variable equal to 
one if the pre-merger director ownership in the acquiring firm is above the annual 
industry median, and zero otherwise. Target and bidder characteristics are computed 
using firm data from the fiscal year immediately preceding the announcement. See Table 
4’s description for definitions of common control variables. Corresponding p-value is 
reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
 
  
Acquirer 
CAR3 
Target 
CAR3 
Combined 
CAR3 Delta ROA  Good Deal Bad Deal 
INTERLOCK -0.057 *** -0.049  -0.052 *** -0.090 ** -1.463 ** 1.281 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.134)  (0.000)  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.001)  
INTERLOCK *DirOwn 0.069 *** 0.052  0.050 *** 0.144 *** 1.457 * -1.485 ** 
 (0.000)  (0.253)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.053)  (0.012)  
DirOwn 0.000  -0.012  0.004  -0.015  -0.070  0.032  
 (0.962)  (0.380)  (0.407)  (0.370)  (0.683)  (0.864)  
Log asset -0.004 *** -0.006  -0.003 ** 0.010 ** -0.116 ** 0.060  
 (0.005)  (0.104)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.022)  (0.233)  
Q -0.005 *** -0.017 *** -0.005 *** 0.002  0.010  0.090 ** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.632)  (0.810)  (0.033)  
Leverage 0.002  0.012  0.002  -0.084 * 0.252  -0.801  
 (0.866)  (0.731)  (0.866)  (0.074)  (0.596)  (0.117)  
CF to Asset -0.015  -0.003  0.005  -0.642 *** -0.504  0.408  
 (0.376)  (0.928)  (0.805)  (0.000)  (0.366)  (0.504)  
Relative Deal Value -0.039 *** -0.093 *** 0.029 *** 0.041 * 0.074  2.262 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.071)  (0.769)  (0.000)  
All Stock -0.016 *** -0.042 *** -0.024 *** 0.023  -0.119  0.740 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.142)  (0.508)  (0.000)  
All Cash 0.025 *** 0.049 *** 0.032 *** 0.023  0.723 *** -1.170 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.255)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Diversifying Merger 0.003  -0.004  0.002  0.011  0.054  -0.244  
 (0.549)  (0.799)  (0.667)  (0.516)  (0.764)  (0.234)  
Year and Industry FE. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 10.5%  8.5%  10.3%  12.4%  11.2%  22.4%  
Num of obs. 1,507   1,462   1,462   1,218   1,507   1,507   
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5.2 Wealth effect of interlock and information asymmetry of target 
I test the information hypothesis by including an interaction term between 
information asymmetry measures and INTERLOCK in the regression of merger 
performance. If an interlock helps transfer information about the target to the acquirer or 
vice versa, it should be more valuable when the target value is opaque to the acquirer. 
Therefore, the benefit of interlock should be more pronounced. Table 6 reports estimates 
from OLS regression, including the information asymmetry measures, controlling for the 
acquirer’s governance. I use different measures for target information asymmetry in 
Panel A and Panel B. HighStdDev and HighR&D are indicator variables with value of 
one if the target’s standard deviation of earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S or R&D is higher 
than the sample median, respectively, and zero otherwise.  
Panel A shows that the acquirers interlocked to targets with higher dispersion in 
earnings forecasts gain 3.8% more than non-interlocked acquirers acquiring similar 
targets. The combined CAR for interlocked bids is higher by 4.2%. The long-run effect is 
even more economically significant: the increase in ROA for the interlocked deals with 
less transparent targets is 0.088 more than the non-interlocked deals, more than three 
times the subsample mean (0.029). The sign of INTERLOCK alone remains significantly 
negative, and the sign of the interaction term between the acquirer’s governance and 
interlock remains significantly positive. In Panel B, R&D is the proxy for target 
information asymmetry. The results are, in general, consistent with Panel A, except that 
combined CAR is statistically insignificant. A possible explanation is that R&D can also 
proxy for growth opportunities in the target, and therefore is by itself positively 
correlated with target announcement return, with significant correlation coefficient of 
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4.3%. This alternative explanation is unrelated to the existence of interlocks. Therefore, 
the effect of interlocks on combined CAR is diluted by the target and becomes 
insignificant. The long-run operating performance, in contrast, shows a larger difference 
between interlocked deals and non-interlocked deals, compared with the coefficient in 
Panel A. 
The evidence supports the prediction that interlocks help alleviate information 
asymmetry between target and acquirer. There is thus a trade-off between cost and 
benefit for the acquirer to take over a target with which it shares key personnel.  
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Table 6: The effect of information asymmetry on announcement effect of interlock 
 
This table presents cross-sectional regression results controlling for information 
asymmetry. Of the 2,194 bids, 140 (6.38%) are interlocked. Target, acquirer, and 
combined firm 3-day CARs (CAR3) are calculated over the event window [-1, +1]. 
ΔROA is the difference between the post-merger 3-year average of industry-adjusted 
ROA and the pre-merger corresponding measure. INTERLOCK is an indicator variable 
equal to one if there is at least one person employed by both target and bidder as either 
director or top executive within 3 years before the announcement, and zero otherwise. 
DirOwn is an indicator variable equal to one if the pre-merger director ownership in the 
acquiring firm is above the annual industry median, and zero otherwise. HighR&D and 
HighStdDev are indicator variables equal to one if the target’s R&D and the standard 
deviation of earnings forecasts are higher than the sample median, respectively, and zero 
otherwise. Target and bidder characteristics are computed using firm data from the fiscal 
year immediately preceding the announcement date. See Table 4’s description for 
definitions of common control variables. Corresponding p-value is reported in the 
parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel A: Dispersion of analyst forecasts of target earnings as measure of information 
asymmetry 
 Acquirer CAR3 Target CAR3 Combined CAR3 Δ ROA 
INTERLOCK -0.080 *** -0.070  -0.074 *** -0.146 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.108)  (0.000)  (0.001)  
INTERLOCK* HighStdDev 0.038 ** 0.036  0.042 ** 0.088 * 
 (0.033)  (0.451)  (0.016)  (0.061)  
HighStdDev -0.005  0.004  -0.001  0.008  
 (0.297)  (0.766)  (0.822)  (0.567)  
INTERLOCK*DirOwn 0.065 *** 0.048  0.039 ** 0.145 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.290)  (0.022)  (0.001)  
DirOwn 0.000  -0.012  0.005  -0.025 * 
 (0.957)  (0.365)  (0.297)  (0.083)  
Log Asset -0.004 *** -0.006 * -0.003 ** 0.007 * 
 (0.005)  (0.096)  (0.011)  (0.068)  
Q -0.005 *** -0.017 *** -0.004 *** 0.006 * 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.098)  
Leverage 0.001  0.013  0.001  -0.081 ** 
 (0.915)  (0.717)  (0.914)  (0.043)  
CF to Asset -0.014  0.000  0.002  -0.687 *** 
 (0.418)  (0.995)  (0.931)  (0.000)  
Relative Deal Value -0.039 *** -0.093 *** 0.030 *** 0.032 * 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.097)  
All Stock -0.016 *** -0.042 *** -0.021 *** 0.017  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.195)  
All Cash 0.025 *** 0.049 *** 0.031 *** 0.023  
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.179)  
Diversifying Merger 0.003  -0.004  0.004  0.006  
 (0.636)  (0.793)  (0.489)  (0.685)  
Year and Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R-square 10.7%  8.4%  10.6%  20.1%  
Number of Observations 1,507   1,462   1, 462   1,218   
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 Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Target R&D expenditure as measure of information asymmetry 
  Acquirer CAR3 Target CAR3 Combined CAR3 Δ ROA  
INTERLOCK -0.086 *** -0.063  -0.068 *** -0.178 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.227)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
INTERLOCK*HighR&D 0.038 * 0.020  0.025  0.104 * 
 (0.068)  (0.722)  (0.234)  (0.081)  
HighR&D 0.007  0.043 ** 0.008  -0.015  
 (0.272)  (0.012)  (0.217)  (0.392)  
INTERLOCK*DirOwn 0.066 *** 0.050  0.041 ** 0.149 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.268)  (0.014)  (0.001)  
DirOwn 0.000  -0.011  0.006  -0.023  
 (0.976)  (0.401)  (0.274)  (0.100)  
Log Asset -0.004 *** -0.006  -0.003 ** 0.008 ** 
 (0.005)  (0.125)  (0.015)  (0.039)  
Q -0.005 *** -0.017 *** -0.004 *** 0.006 * 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.082)  
Leverage 0.003  0.015  0.003  -0.086 ** 
 (0.801)  (0.662)  (0.817)  (0.032)  
CF to Asset -0.014  0.011  0.000  -0.700 *** 
 (0.409)  (0.745)  (0.991)  (0.000)  
Relative Deal Value -0.039 *** -0.094 *** 0.031 *** 0.035 * 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.069)  
All Stock -0.016 *** -0.041 *** -0.021 *** 0.019  
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.151)  
All Cash 0.025 *** 0.050 *** 0.031 *** 0.024  
 (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.169)  
Diversifying Merger 0.003  -0.003  0.004  0.005  
 (0.632)  (0.826)  (0.486)  (0.723)  
Year and Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R-square 10.7%  8.8%  10.5%  20.0%  
Number of Observations 1,507   1,462   1, 462   1,218   
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5.3 Interlock and the distribution of transaction surplus 
So far the attention of this paper has been focused on the return matrix. To 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of interlock on shareholders’ wealth, I 
also estimate the dollar value wealth created in merger transactions and investigate the 
distribution of total surplus between the acquirer and the target. While abnormal stock 
return measures the absolute wealth effect to shareholders, proportional dollar value 
wealth is a better proxy for the negotiated allocation of surplus. Following Bates, 
Lemmon, and Linck (2006), I calculate the change in market value (ΔMV) of each firm 
as the product of pre-bid market value on 2 days prior to the announcement and the 3-day 
CAR. Total market value change is the sum of the changes in acquirer market value and 
target market value, with acquirer’s toehold adjusted. The variable of interest is the share 
of total gains or losses accrued to acquirer shareholders, calculated as the change in 
acquirer’s market value divided by total market value change.  
According to the agency hypothesis, an interlocking agent, regardless of being 
concurrent or lagged interlock, may have stock ownership with both the acquiring firm 
and the target. She thus has incentive to act in favor of the firm where the value of 
personal wealth is higher, which often means hurting the other firm. I measure the 
relative ownership by the difference between the interlocking agent’s dollar value wealth 
in the acquirer and in the target, scaled by the sum of her wealth in the two firms. Table 7 
shows the OLS regression of fractional surplus to the acquirer on interlocking agent’s 
relative ownership in the acquirer and control variables. The sample includes 98 
transactions where individual stock ownership of the interlocking agent is available at 
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both firms. Due to the small sample size, year and industry fixed effects are not included 
in this regression.  
Model 1 suggests that the proportional surplus distributed to the acquirer is 
positively correlated with the interlocking agent’s relative ownership in the acquirer. The 
coefficient on relative ownership indicates that if the interlocking agent’s ownership in 
acquirer stock worth 1% more than her ownership in target stock, the acquirer gains 
0.229% more of the total surplus than an acquirer whose interlocking agent owns equal 
amount in both firms. The dependent variables in Model 2 and 3 of Table 7 are the 
changes in acquirer market value and target market value, respectively. The significantly 
positive sign of relative ownership in Model 2 and negative sign in Model 3 further 
support the prediction that a self-dealing agent will exert influence in the negotiation 
process, and act in favor of the shareholders to whom her interest is better aligned. 
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Table 7: Interlock and the distribution of transaction surplus 
 
This table presents OLS regressions of the fractional surplus to the acquirer on 
interlocking agent’s relative ownership in the acquirer and control variables. The sample 
includes 98 transactions where individual stock ownership of the interlocking agent is 
available at both firms. The dependent variables are the share of total surplus accrued to 
acquirer shareholders, the change in acquirer market value, and the change in target 
market value. Share of total surplus to acquirer is calculated as the change in acquirer 
market value divided by total market value change. Change in market value (ΔMV) of is 
the product of pre-bid market value on 2 days prior to the announcement and the 3-day 
CAR. Total market value change is the sum of the changes in acquirer market value and 
target market value, with acquirer’s toehold adjusted. RelativeOwn is the difference 
between the interlocking agent’s dollar value wealth in the acquirer and in the target, 
scaled by the sum of her wealth in the two firms. See Table 4’s description for definitions 
of common control variables. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
 
Parameter 
Share of surplus to 
Acquirer (%) ΔMV of Acq ($) ΔMV of Tgt ($) 
Intercept 0.086  3.373 ** -1.728 *** 
 (0.822)  (0.045)  (0.004)  
RelativeOwn 0.229 * 0.950 * -0.342 * 
 (0.071)  (0.086)  (0.077)  
Log asset -0.083  -0.933 *** 0.448 *** 
 (0.146)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Q 0.056  -0.145  0.133 ** 
 (0.168)  (0.411)  (0.032)  
Leverage 0.597  1.700  -0.623  
 (0.118)  (0.307)  (0.284)  
CF to Asset -0.222  -0.109  -0.168  
 (0.610)  (0.954)  (0.800)  
Relative Deal Value -0.122  2.113 ** -0.890 ** 
 (0.611)  (0.046)  (0.016)  
All Stock -0.106  -1.303 * 0.516 ** 
 (0.523)  (0.074)  (0.043)  
Tender Offer -0.095  0.244  -0.034  
 (0.744)  (0.847)  (0.938)  
Multiple Bid 0.183  0.937  -0.422  
 (0.687)  (0.637)  (0.542)  
Year and Industry Fixed Effects No  No  No  
Adjusted R-square 5.5%  12.3%  25.5%  
Number of Observations 98   98   98   
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5.4 Interlock and the choice of payment method 
In addition to its wealth effect, an interlock between the acquirer and the target also 
impacts the choice of payment method, that is, whether the acquirer chooses to use equity 
or cash or a mixture of both to pay for the acquisition. The empirical literature has found 
that overvaluation of its stock gives the acquirer more incentive to do a stock deal. 
However, from the target’s perspective, if the acquirer’s stock value is opaque, the target 
may refuse to accept stock payment or require a higher premium to compensate for the 
potential loss. Therefore, uncertainty about the acquirer’s stock value should be 
negatively associated with the use of stock as payment, ceteris paribus. According to the 
information hypothesis, interlocks reduce the information asymmetry between the two 
firms, which predicts a higher likelihood of stock payment when the two firms are 
interlocked. The agency hypothesis has no clear prediction on this issue.  
Table 8, Panel A presents the results from logistic regressions of the choice of 
payment method on INTERLOCK and control variables. The dependent variable is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the acquisition is paid solely in acquirer’s stock, and 
zero otherwise. Marginal effects are calculated as the change in the probability given a 
one standard deviation increase in continuous variables, or a shift from zero to one in 
indicator variables, holding all other variables at their means. INTERLOCK is 
significantly positive in the baseline model; that is, when the two firms share a common 
director or officer, the likelihood of pure stock payment is higher by 15.1%. Model (2) 
introduces acquirer opacity and shows that interlocks increase the likelihood of using 
stock payment by 18.6% only for opaque acquirers. It is interesting to observe that the 
positive effect of INTERLOCK is absorbed by its interaction term with acquirer opacity, 
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indicating that the existence of interlock mostly helps the acquirers that have difficulties 
conveying their stock value, but not the transparent acquirers. The negative sign on the 
analysts’ forecasts dispersion of the acquirer is consistent with the intuition that targets 
are reluctant to accept acquirers’ stock for which analysts have very different forecasts. 
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Table 8: Logistic model of the choice of payment method 
 
Panel A presents a logistic model of the relation between the choice of stock as payment 
method and the existence of interlock. The dependent variable is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the acquisition is paid in 100% stock equity, and zero otherwise. 1,111 
bids are pure stock bids.  Panel B presents regression results of merger premium on the 
existence of interlock. The dependent variable is final premium, computed as the final bid 
price per share divided by the target’s share price 42 trading days prior to the 
announcement date, less one. INTERLOCK is an indicator variable equal to one if there 
is at least one person employed by both target and bidder as either director or top 
executive within 3 years before the announcement, and zero otherwise. HighStdDev is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer’s (target’s) standard deviation of earnings 
forecasts is higher than the sample median, and zero otherwise. P/B is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the acquirer’s price-to-book ratio is higher than the sample 
median, and zero otherwise. Relative Cash is cash reserve divided by the transaction 
value of the deal. Runup is the acquirer’s or target’s stock price on day -42 divided by its 
stock price on day -2. Market RunUp is the corresponding measure calculated using 
CRSP market index. Poison Pill is an indicator variable equal to one if the target adopts 
the poison pill clause. Positive Toehold is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
acquirer's ownership in the target is non-zero prior to the announcement. See Table 4’s 
description for definitions of common control variables. Marginal effects are provided in 
parentheses, as the change in the probability given a one standard deviation increase in 
continuous variables, or a shift from zero to one in indicator variables, holding all other 
variables at their means. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 8 (continued)  
 
Panel A: Logistic model of the choice of payment method 
 
Parameter Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Intercept -1.330  -0.990  -0.828  -1.499  -1.394  
Interlock 0.603 ** 0.124  0.419  0.968 *** 0.970 *** 
 (0.151)  (0.031)  (0.105)  (0.242)  (0.242)  
HighStdDev (Acquirer)  -0.205 * -0.218 * -0.068  -0.086  
   (-0.051)  (-0.054)  (-0.017)  (-0.021)  
INTERLOCK * HighStdDev (Acquirer)  0.743 * 0.918 *    
   (0.186)  (0.229)     
HighStdDev (Target)     0.274 *    
     (0.069)     
INTERLOCK * HighStdDev (Target)    -0.746     
     (-0.186)     
P/B      0.590 *** 0.584 *** 
       (0.147)  (0.146)  
INTERLOCK * P/B      -0.797 * -1.095 * 
      (-0.199)  (-0.274)  
INTERLOCK * P/B * HighStdDev (Acquirer)      0.464  
       (0.116)  
Relative Cash -0.099 *** -0.092 ** -0.096 ** -0.079 ** -0.078 ** 
 (-0.079)  (-0.073)  (-0.077)  (-0.063)  (-0.063)  
Log asset -0.011  -0.016  -0.022  -0.027  -0.026  
 (-0.006)  (-0.008)  (-0.011)  (-0.014)  (-0.014)  
Q 0.219 *** 0.211 *** 0.212 *** 0.161 *** 0.163 *** 
 (0.099)  (0.096)  (0.096)  (0.073)  (0.074)  
Runup (Acquirer) 0.127 * 0.132 * 0.131 * 0.067  0.071  
 (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.016)  (0.017)  
Market Runup 0.763  0.756  0.785  0.542  0.547  
 (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.022)  (0.023)  
Diversifying Merger -0.169  -0.182  -0.172  -0.192  -0.196  
 (-0.042)  (-0.046)  (-0.043)  (-0.048)  (-0.049)  
Multiple Bid -0.781 *** -0.771 *** -0.764 *** -0.803 *** -0.799 *** 
 (-0.195)  (-0.193)  (-0.191)  (-0.201)  (-0.200)  
Tender Offer -3.497 *** -3.504 *** -3.513 *** -3.578 *** -3.584 *** 
 (-0.874)  (-0.876)  (-0.878)  (-0.895)  (-0.896)  
Year and Industry fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Pseudo Rsq 0.261  0.263  0.264  0.270  0.270  
num of obs 1,906   1,906   1,906   1,903   1,903   
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Table 8 (continued)  
 
Panel B: OLS regression of the merger premium 
 
Parameter Model (1)   Model (2)   
INTERLOCK 0.001  0.032  
 (0.966)  (0.329)  
P/B 0.023 ** 0.026 ** 
 (0.043)  (0.025)  
INTERLOCK * P/B   -0.049  
   (0.237)  
Log asset -0.008 ** -0.008 ** 
 (0.023)  (0.021)  
Q -0.011 *** -0.010 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  
Leverage -0.032  -0.029  
 (0.339)  (0.382)  
CF to Asset 0.019  0.017  
 (0.497)  (0.542)  
Runup (Target) 0.471 *** 0.472 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Hostile 0.116 *** 0.116 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  
Poison Pill -0.075  -0.074  
 (0.384)  (0.391)  
Multiple Bid 0.023  0.023  
 (0.247)  (0.251)  
Tender Offer -0.015  -0.015  
 (0.725)  (0.718)  
Positive Toehold 0.057  0.053  
 (0.122)  (0.147)  
Relative Deal Value -0.006  -0.006  
 (0.710)  (0.737)  
Diversifying Merger -0.007  -0.007  
 (0.597)  (0.589)  
Year and Industry FE. Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 33.1%  33.1%  
Num of observations 1,396   1,396   
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The information asymmetry in a merger is two-sided, in which an acquirer is also 
uncertain about the target’s value and thus wants to use its stock as contingent payment to 
reduce the cost of overpayment (Hansen, 1987). Therefore it is also interesting to test 
whether interlocks transfer non-public information about the target and further reduce the 
necessity of using stock as protection against “lemons”. Model (3) includes the target’s 
analysts’ forecast dispersion and the sign is significantly positive; that is, if the target’s 
future cash flow is opaque, the acquirer has more difficulty estimating the synergy, and 
the value of contingent payment is more pronounced. The interaction term between the 
target’s opacity and INTERLOCK is negative as predicted but not statistically significant.  
The control variables have signs that are consistent with the previous literature: the 
acquirer is more likely to use equity as payment when it has less cash in hand, when the 
target has more growth opportunities (measured by Q), when the acquirer’s equity is 
overvalued (measured by run-up), when there is not competing bid on the target, and 
when it is not a tender offer.  
One of the concerns for target shareholders is that the acquirer may use overvalued 
stock as currency to purchase the less overvalued or even undervalued assets. Shleifer 
and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) propose models in which 
the target management accepts overvalued stock either due to a short time-horizon or due 
to overestimation of the merger synergies, which is positively correlated with the market 
valuation. Empirical studies document that the incidence of all-stock acquisitions 
increases with acquirer’s stock valuation (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 
2005; Ang and Cheng, 2006; Dong, Hisrshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh, 2006). 
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I follow Dong, Hisrshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) by using price-to-book 
ratio as a proxy of the acquirer’s stock misvaluation. P/B is an indicator variable equal to 
one if the acquirer’s price-to-book ratio is higher than the sample median, and zero 
otherwise. The information hypothesis predicts that interlocks alleviate the information 
asymmetry between acquirers and targets. If target management accepts overvalued stock 
because they overestimate the synergy created in the merger, the existence of an interlock 
will reduce such overestimation and overvalued acquirer’s stock will be rejected. Model 
(4) and (5) in Table 8, Panel A show that an acquirer with higher price-to-book ratio is 
more likely to make an all-stock offer by 14.7%, compared with fairly-valued acquirers. 
But when it shares a common director or officer with the target, the acquirer is less likely 
to use its stock by 20%. This effect does not depend on the opacity of acquirers.  
The relationship between merger premium and interlocks further supports the 
information hypothesis. Panel B of Table 8 shows the OLS regression results of merger 
premium on INTERLOCK and control variables. The dependent variable is final 
premium, computed as the final bid price per share divided by the target’s share price 42 
trading days prior to the announcement date, less one. This test is restricted to 1396 bids 
where bidder’s stock consists at least 50% of the payment and where the final price per 
share is available from SDC. As indicated in Panel B, the overvaluation of bidder’s stock, 
measured by P/B, leads to higher premium, whereas the coefficient of the interaction 
term between P/B and INTERLOCK is negative, although not statistically significant. A 
possible explanation is that on the one hand, a target observes higher P/B of the bidder 
therefore negotiates for higher premium. On the other hand, an interlock reduces the use 
 
57
of overvalued stock by alleviating target’s overestimation of merger synergy, therefore 
the surviving bids are associated with lower misperception and a lower premium.  
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Chapter 6: Further Empirical Evidence on Merger Characteristics 
To better understand the wealth effect of interlock between acquirer and target, I 
further investigate whether interlocks influence other aspects of M&A. I test whether 
acquisition is more likely to occur between two firms with a common director or officer 
in the first place. I then examine the relationship between interlock and the rate of deal 
completion.  
6.1 Probability of acquisition and interlocks  
Both the agency hypothesis and information hypothesis predict that when 
searching for a potential buyer (seller), a firm is more likely to choose another firm with 
which it shares a connection. On the one hand, individual ownership and personal 
connections at the other firm give an interlock director/officer the incentive to vote for 
her other employer. On the other hand, interlock may facilitate information transfer 
between the two firms therefore reduce the remarkable search cost. In this section, I 
follow Ishii and Xuan (2010) and calculate the expected rate of interlock between two 
firms, an indirect approach to test the relation between interlock and acquisition. 
The first row of Table 9 represents the 2,194 pairs of sample acquirers and targets, 
140 (6.38%) of which are identified as interlocked bids. For each bid, I associate the 
sample acquirer with a “random target”, a firm drawn randomly from the sample target’s 
industry (same 2-digit SIC code) in the announcement year. The 2,194 random-match 
pairs are then merged with a director/officer dataset from Compact Disclosure and 
identified whether there is an interlock  between the two firms or not. This procedure is 
repeated for 500 times and Row (2) reports the average number and percentage of 
interlocks. There are 8.3 (0.38%) interlocks on average from the 500 iterations. Similarly, 
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I form pairs of sample targets and random acquirers and identify 7.4 (0.34%) interlocks in 
the simulated sample. Row (4) represents simulated pairs in which a random firm from 
the acquirer’s industry is matched to a random firm from the target’s industry. 
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Table 9: Probability of acquisition and interlocks 
 
This table tests whether the probability of acquisition is higher if the acquirer and target 
are interlocked. Two firms are defined as interlocked if at least one person is employed 
by both firms as either a director or a top executive within 3 years before the 
announcement. Of the 2,194 bides, 140 (6.38%) are interlocked. The second column 
reports the total number of pairs in which two firms are interlocked; and the third column 
reports the significance level of Row (2)–(4) from Row (1). Row (1) represents the 2,194 
pairs of acquirer and target in the event sample used in this study. Row (2) represents 
pairs of a sample acquirer and a random target-match, which is a random firm with the 
same 2-digit SIC code as the sample target in the acquisition announcement year. The 
summary statistics are based on the procedure being repeated 500 times. Row (3) 
represents pairs of a sample target and a random acquirer-match. Row (4) represents pairs 
of a random acquirer-match and a random target-match. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
    
# of 
interlocked 
bids 
% of 
interlocked 
bids 
Difference 
from (1) 
Sample Acquirers and Sample Targets (1) 140 6.38%  
Sample Acquirers and Random Targets (2) 8.3 0.38% *** 
Random Acquirers and Sample Targets (3) 7.4 0.34% *** 
Random Acquirers and Random Targets (4) 4.7 0.21% *** 
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The statistics in Rows (2)–(4) shows the expected likelihood of an interlock 
between a potential pair of acquirer and target. The matching approach takes industry 
effect and year effect into account. Compared with the result in Ishii and Xuan (2010) 
that the observed level of social connection between actual acquirers and targets is more 
than twice as high as that between potential acquirers and targets, the evidence here on 
interlock is much stronger. The average ratio of interlock between potential acquirers and 
targets is only 0.21%, compared with 6.38% in the actual merger event sample. In other 
words, the occurrence of acquisition is strongly correlated with the existence of interlock. 
6.2 Interlock and deal completion  
I also test whether interlocks influence deal completion. Table 10 tabulates the 
coefficient estimates from a logistic regression, in which the dependent variable is an 
indicator variable, equal to one if the transaction is consummated and zero otherwise. 
Marginal effects are calculated as the change in the probability given a one standard 
deviation increase in continuous variables, or a shift from zero to one in indicator 
variables, holding all other variables at their means. 
The coefficient of interlock in the baseline model is 0.87, corresponding to an 
increase of 12.7% in the likelihood of deal completion if the two firms share a director or 
officer. Model (2) shows that if there are multiple bids, the sample bidder is less likely to 
win the auction and complete the acquisition. However, given the existence of competing 
bids, an interlocked bidder has a 23% higher chance of winning the auction and closing 
the deal. This difference is both statistically and economically significant, implying less 
information asymmetry between the two firms or a lower standard of due diligence. 
Model (3) and (4) include combined CAR and final premium, both of which have 
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positive sign but are not significant when interacted with INTERLOCK. This evidence 
shows that when merger performance is lower, the existence of interlock does not help 
stop a seemingly unprofitable transaction.  
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Table 10: Logistic regression analysis of deal completion and interlock 
 
This table presents a logistic model of the relation between the probability of a deal being 
completed and the existence of interlock. The dependent variable is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 for completed bids, and zero otherwise. Of the 2, 194 bids, 1,738 bids are 
completed. INTERLOCK is an indicator variable equal to one if there is at least one 
person employed by both target and bidder as either director or top executive within 3 
years before the announcement, and zero otherwise. There are 140 (6.38%) interlocked 
deals. Toehold is the percent of ownership in the target by the acquirer at the 
announcement. Final premium is calculated as the final bid price per share from SDC 
divided by the target’s stock price 42 trading days prior to announcement, less one. 
Target and bidder characteristics are computed using firm data from the fiscal year 
immediately preceding the announcement date. See Table 4’s description for definitions 
of common control variables. Marginal effects are provided in parentheses, as the change 
in the probability given a one standard deviation increase in a continuous variable, or a 
shift from zero to one in an indicator variable, holding all other variables constant at their 
means. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
Parameter 
Model 
(1)   
Model 
(2)   
 Model 
(3)   
 Model 
(4)   
Intercept -0.174  -0.439  -0.411  -0.531  
 (-0.025)  (-0.064)  (-0.059)  (-0.079)  
INTERLOCK 0.865 *** 0.615 * 0.833 *** 1.655 ** 
 (0.127)  (0.090)  (0.120)  (0.245)  
INTERLOCK*Multiple Bid  1.574 *    
   (0.231)     
Multiple Bid   -2.357 *** -2.360 *** -2.100 *** 
   (-0.345)  (-0.339)  (-0.311)  
INTERLOCK*Combined CAR3   0.631    
    (0.091)    
Combined CAR3    1.317 *   
    (0.189)    
INTERLOCK* 
Premium     -1.212  
     (-0.180)  
 Premium     0.601 ** 
     (0.089)  
Toehold   -1.489 *** -1.315 *** -1.167 *** 
   (-0.218)  (-0.189)  (-0.173)  
Tender Offer   0.937 *** 0.909 *** 1.072 *** 
   (0.137)  (0.131)  (0.159)  
Log Asset 0.173 *** 0.202 *** 0.195 *** 0.162 *** 
 (0.052)  (0.061)  (0.058)  (0.050)  
Q 0.028  0.044  0.044  0.013  
 (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.004)  
Leverage -0.743 ** -0.822 ** -0.637  -0.748  
 (-0.020)  (-0.022)  (-0.016)  (-0.020)  
CF to Asset 0.202  -0.010  0.356  0.981  
 (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.020)  
Relative Deal Value -1.069 *** -0.900 *** -0.996 *** -1.058 *** 
 (-0.051)  (-0.043)  (-0.047)  (-0.051)  
All Stock 0.047  -0.008  0.032  0.046  
 (0.007)  (-0.001)  (0.005)  (0.007)  
All Cash -0.347 * -0.456 ** -0.520 ** -0.630 ** 
 (-0.051)  (-0.067)  (-0.075)  (-0.093)  
Diversifying Merger -0.139  -0.152  -0.121  -0.247  
 (-0.020)  (-0.022)  (-0.017)  (-0.037)  
Year and Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Pseudo R-square 11.2%  21.2%  21.5%  27.5%  
Number of Observations 2,194   2,194   2,155  1,382   
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Note that the additional evidence of higher likelihood of mergers between 
interlocked firms and higher completion rate does not differentiate the two hypotheses. 
On the one hand, the information hypothesis predicts that interlocks facilitate transactions 
that otherwise may not be initiated or completed due to high search costs or high 
standards of due diligence. On the other hand, an interlocking agent may want to 
maximize her personal interest by facilitating a merger with the interlocked firm. The 
higher likelihood of winning an auction for an interlocked bidder may result from better 
knowledge of the target asset, or simply from favoritism of the target over other bidders. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
In this paper, I investigate the role of top management and board interlocks 
between acquirers and targets in an M&A setting, and develop two non-mutually 
exclusive hypotheses. An interlocking agent may serve as a conduit of information 
between the two firms and reduce the cost of information gathering for both the acquirer 
and the target. Interlocks may also exacerbate agency problems due to conflicts of 
interest.  
Supporting evidence is found for both hypotheses. I test for the effect of 
interlocks on merger characteristics and outcomes, using a sample of 2,194 bids between 
US public firms from 1991 to 2003, including 140 interlocked deals. Interlocked deals 
are more likely to use equity payment, to have higher relative deal value, and to have a 
target with higher Q. These characteristics are associated with more severe information 
asymmetry, indicating that an interlocking agent efficiently transfers information between 
the two firms and hence facilitates the deal that otherwise may not be initiated or 
completed. 
Consistent with the agency hypothesis, I find the acquirer’s announcement return 
is lower by 1.3% in an interlocked deal. A further investigation of whether the negative 
wealth effect of interlocks varies with the acquirer’s pre-merger governance level 
confirms the hypothesized self-dealing behavior. Strongly governed acquirers receive 
higher announcement returns and have better post-acquisition performance in interlocked 
deals. In addition, the proportional merger surplus accrued to an acquirer is positively 
correlated with the interlocking agent’s ownership in the acquirer relative to her 
ownership in the target. Consistent with the information hypothesis, when the value of 
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the target is opaque, interlocks are associated with higher acquirers’ announcement 
returns and better long-term performance. Interlocked acquirers are also more likely to 
use equity as payment, especially when the acquirer’s stock value is opaque. Target 
CARs are not influenced by the existence of interlock, indicating the wealth effect of 
interlocks on acquirers is not due to overpayment. In addition, I find acquisitions are 
more likely to occur between two interlocked firms and such deals have a higher 
completion rate. 
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